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Networks and Meaning: Styles and Switchings
Zusammenfassung: Der Aufsatz setzt Niklas Luhmanns Systemtheorie in Beziehung zur 
soziologischen Netzwerkanalyse, um Grundlagen für eine allgemeine Netzwerktheo-
rie zu entwickeln. Er beginnt mit Luhmanns Diskussion von Sinn als einer zentralen 
Kategorie der Soziologie. Luhmanns Formulierung wird erweitert von einem Fokus auf 
die Dyade und doppelte Kontingenz hin zur Reichweite von Netzwerken und daher 
multipler Kontingenz. Während Kommunikations- und Handlungsaspekte von Sinn 
in Netzwerken ineinandergreifen, entflechtet der Aufsatz analytisch deren jeweils 
besondere Bedingungen und führt dabei die Konzepte Netdoms, Netdom Switching und 
Discipline ein. Netzwerktheorie lenkt damit den Blick auf das Zusammenspiel von zeit-
lichen, sozialen und interpretativen Dynamiken in der Konstitution und Verkettung 
von Sinnhorizonten. Darüber hinaus entfaltet der Aufsatz das Konzept »Style« als syn-
kopierte Komplexität, um Luhmanns Top-Down-Ansatz bei der selbstreferentiellen 
Reproduktion von funktionalen Subsystemen zu ergänzen. 
Introduction
Niklas Luhmann asserted early that meaning is the basic concept of sociology 
(Habermas / Luhmann 1971). We build up Luhmann’s explication of meaning 
by transposing it to the formation and dynamics of multiple relations in net-
works. Although Luhmann’s theory has been widely ignored in North-Ameri-
can sociology, it can clarify phenomenology and theory for emergent social for-
mations. Thus it can help bring the coherence across empirical studies, on both 
micro- and meso-levels, that Harrison White and others are seeking in Identity 
and Control (2008).
Luhmann’s theory was in direction anti-subjectivist, rejecting the theory of the 
subject as old-european thinking and searching for a better way to grasp mod-
ern reality. He like us emphasizes the importance of social processes over the 
individual person. Luhmann chooses the distinction between system and envi-
ronment as his foundation, whereas we build on the interplay of identity and 
control in networks. This conceptualization allows us to remain distant from 
the notion of the subject and nevertheless to account for network action, which 
Luhmann chose to avoid. 
Our approach to meaning around expectations derives from chapter 2 of Social 
Systems and then leads into his basic discrimination between communication 
and action in chapter 4. That sets up our exposition of networks in Part II and 
of action disciplines in Part III. We draw also on Luhmann’s (1995) insights into 
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temporal structure (ch. 8, 9) and reflexivity (ch. 11). In turn, network theory can 
open out and expand on Luhmann, just as he can supply better foundations for 
us. Part IV introduces switchings and styles in order to reconstrue and deepen 
Part I. Then Part V generalizes Luhmann’s overarching functional subsystems. 
I. Meaning through expectations 
In an early statement, Luhmann (Habermas / Luhmann 1971) argued that 
meaning should be one of the basic concepts of sociology, because social proc-
esses and structures are inherently laden with meaning. But in contrast to 
Max Weber’s and Alfred Schütz’s conceptualizations, Luhmann does not view 
meaning as limited to the subjective perception and cognition of actors. Rather, 
his crucial clarification is that meaning becomes realized through processes 
which are produced and reproduced socially. While the theoretical framework 
differs, this fits in principle with recent developments in theory for networks 
interwoven with interpretive domains (Mische / White 1998; Watts 2007) or 
which conceive of social networks as cultural patterns (Fine / Kleinman 1983; 
Emirbayer / Goodwin 1994). 
According to Luhmann, meaning emerges as a horizon of possibilities:
Meaning is the continual actualization of potentialities … everything 
actual has meaning only within a horizon of possibilities indicated … one 
of the possibilities that could be connected up can and must be selected 
as the next actuality, as soon as what is actual at the moment has faded 
away, transpired, and given up its actuality out of its own instability … 
understanding happens only if one projects the experience of meaning or 
of meaningful action onto other systems … and only if one also takes 
into consideration that the other systems … themselves make meaningful 
distinctions … Observation is the basic operation of understanding. (1995, 
65)1 
This formulation, we argue, applies not only for dyads, but also across situa-
tions with multiple actors, including bystanders as well as talkers and listeners. 
In this sense observations likewise are the basic operations of a social network. 
For Luhmann, expectations are keyed around situations: »Situations change 
from moment to moment and shift the other possibilities that they suggest.« 
(1995, 284) And he insisted that social systems generate meaning from out of 
this basic contingency. Just how does the selection of operations come about?
Symbolic generalizations condense the referential structure of every meaning 
into expectations … by the intervening selection of a narrower repertoire 
of possibilities … Accordingly, symbolic generalizations … are contained 
1 Here and in quotes that follow, we mark in boldface the first appearance of each construct of 
Luhmann that is core for our argument. 
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and refabricated within a network of expectations … The absorption of 
uncertainty runs its course by stabilizing expectations … Explaining away 
disappointments provides precise results that can be fitted into a cognitive 
picture of the world … and it re-establishes the security of expectations. 
(1995, 96, 110, 333)
This formulation points toward networks seen as the continuing realization of 
selective associations: expectational structures – such as kinship classification 
systems – thus arise as byproducts of searches to reduce uncertainty.
II. Communication and Networks
Communication must be composed not only of the utterance and its infor-
mation but also entails some understandings. Luhmann’s formulation points 
toward networks seen as the continuing realization of selective associations: 
»Relations acquire structural value only because the relations realized at any 
given time present a selection from a plurality of combinatory possibilities.« (1995, 
283) Even though Luhmann refers here primarily to relations between com-
munications as the basic units of social systems, his arguments can be trans-
posed to relations in social networks, too. These are certainly ›selections from 
a plurality of combinatory possibilities‹, and they are similarly based on mean-
ing. Social networks are then structures of constraints being constituted and 
reconstituted through the course of communication (ch. 8). Communication 
invokes neighboring relations in this network sense, across subsequent com-
munications: »Reproduction requires adequate local security, requires that the 
next element be within reach, so to speak, like an answer to a question.« (1995, 
285) So such meanings will over time, for a second-order observer, limn a net-
work, within or across particular domains2: »From every element, specific other 
(not just any other) elements must be accessible, and this must … stem from 
their own accessibility.« (1995, 283)
Expectations that constitute social networks vary in their vulnerability to expe-
rience, as between kinship and acquaintance contexts. Luhmann focuses on 
selection of events to clarify the dynamic nature of communication. »Events … 
occur only once and only in the briefest period necessary for their appearance 
(the ›specious present‹) … and cannot be repeated … By information we mean 
an event that selects.« (1995, 67)
We go on to argue that the dynamics of transitivity in a network generate and 
sustain story sets that frame events in episodes of meaning expressed through 
symbolic generalizations. Luhmann (1995) himself delays networks (to ch. 10) 
and in one place reduces them to sheer plumbing, a collection of pipes for 
flows among locations. But social networks are, we argue along with Podolny 
2 For a broad recent overview see Fuhse 2007.
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(2001), prisms through and in which meaning is constituted and thus can be 
discerned.
In a current analysis of networks, Matthew Bothner, Edward Smith, and Har-
rison White are taking a prismatic perspective (2007). In particular, the authors 
focus on the reputational consequences of fragile versus robust positions in 
networks. Bothner et al. parse occupants of fragile positions as those who 
receive a disproportionate share of support (esteem, recognition, deference, 
and so on) from those who themselves are tenuously situated in social struc-
ture, whereas robustly positioned actors we construe, much like a multi-legged 
table on a dais, as diversified across a range of different supporters. Using socio-
metric data on the Nortons – the Italian gang of William F. Whyte’s celebrated 
Street Corner Society – and on the members of Theodore Newcomb’s classic fra-
ternity experiment, Bothner et al. find that fragility erodes future status. This 
line of work suggests that ties are conduits for reputational spillovers across a 
network – having a weak sponsor chips away at one’s halo.
However, explicit formulation in terms of ties can fall into Luhmann’s own 
dyad trap! Luhmann himself suffered (as a second-order observer) a blind 
spot around meaning contingency. He unnecessarily limited his account of how 
structures of meaning develop to the dyadic level and the notion of ›double 
contingency‹ (ch. 3).3 Dyadic processes are important, and Luhmann’s argu-
ment mirrors that of Eric Leifer (1988) about expectational structures arising 
through the transactions between two people in chess. But in order to arrive 
at a better understanding of more comprehensive social processes, one has to 
make the step from isolated dyads to views across a mesh of interrelations. 
Since nothing in Luhmann’s formulation restricts the focus to a dyad, we sug-
gest transposing it to a discussion of ›multiple contingency‹.
The story set that any network breeds enables explainings-away to be fash-
ioned, and these reaffirm context. Expectations in a domain are held by mul-
tiple alters across neighboring egos in the continuing reproduction of a social 
network. This was already realized by Goffman (1981, »the not-addressed 
recipient of information«). It should have been included into Luhmann’s the-
ory as a further constraint on what of the meaning horizon is actualized in his 
communication system. But for Luhmann »the concepts of ego and alter (alter 
ego) do not stand for roles, persons or systems, but for special horizons that 
collect and bind together meaningful references.« (1995, 81) And so, instead of 
pursuing this path to relational patterns in networks, he substitutes morality 
for the specification of the spreading-out of social generalizations: »the oppo-
sition between consensus and dissent … the social dimension tends to boil 
down to morality.« (1995, 81) Yet the spreading out of these special horizons 
surely calls for specification of communication systems over time in domains of 
content that come intertwined with pattern of social connection. 
3 We concede that his is a functionalist account that does not stress empirical study.
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III. Action and Disciplines
Luhmann starts from communications as the basic building blocks of social 
process. However, he also points to the fact that communication is continually 
perceived as action, in the horizon of meaning. It is these action facets of social 
process that we focus on now. According to Luhmann,
communication cannot be conceived as action, nor can the process of 
communication be conceived as a chain of actions … The most important 
consequence of this analysis is that communication cannot be observed 
directly, only inferred. To be observed, or to observe itself, a communication 
system must be flagged … [so] one can read from succeeding action 
whether one has been understood or not … action is constituted socially 
in two different contexts: as information (or a theme of communication) 
or as the act of utterance … Only by action does communication become 
fixed in time as a simple event … addressees for further communication 
are thereby established as points of connection for further action. (1995, 
164f.)
Actions do flag communications, but it is only us as observers who thereby 
specify some network: »actions combine determinacy and indeterminacy. They 
are determined in their momentary actuality, whatever attributive basis one 
makes answerable, and they are indeterminate with reference to the connec-
tive value they incorporate.« (1995, 167)
Utterance is guided by anticipations of the reactions of the others, and not only 
by the expected further current of communication, but also by the impacts of 
the utterance on future cooperations and transactions. These expectations con-
tinue, as pointed out earlier, to be negotiated and altered through events in 
situations. The act of utterance is thus also itself guided by an understanding of 
the social situation, in addition to the constraints in the communications, well 
spelled out by Luhmann.
A study by David Gibson (2005) of turn-taking in meetings of managers for 
coordination in a large bank specifies one example. It is a sophisticated study of 
how social situation influences communication. It instantiates the earlier quote 
from Luhmann (1995, 283) – »the relations realized at any given time present a 
selection from a plurality of combinatory possibilities« –, but goes beyond. Realiza-
tion across the group of each next subsequent pair of speaker and addressee is 
heavily biased by the immediately preceding pair in this turn-taking. Gibson’s 
coding procedure presses further Luhmann’s formulation of meaning: the 
horizons of meaning for these switches of turn-taking, which take but millisec-
onds, depend on shifting occupancies of speaker and target roles – and so vari-
ously on triadic or quartet configurations. These meanings are not accessible to 
first-order observation by participants.
Luhmann summarizes on communication and action as follows: 
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We give a double answer to the question of what comprises a social 
system: communications and their attributions as actions. Neither aspect is 
capable of evolving without the other … Communication is the elemental 
unit of self-constitution; action is the elemental unit of social systems’ 
self-observation and self-description … synthesis of selections and the 
possibility of attributing them as action makes it possible to selectively 
organize accompanying self-reference. (1995, 174f.) 
Thus, meaning constitutes the perceptual horizon of action in the situation, 
and accordingly there is correlation to communication in network. It is pre-
cisely the attribution as action which allows for expectations to organize in 
social networks, and to constrain social processes in meaningful ways.
And as with communication, also in the action framework of meaning, social 
and temporal aspects come intertwined. Expectations about behavior involve 
not only ›who‹ but also ›when‹ and the anticipations of still further action. 
Reinstatement of expectability is a requirement not of stability but of 
reproduction … the meaning of an action is constituted within a horizon 
of expectation that anticipates further action – whether by expecting a 
meaningful sequence to continue (as with the next digit when dialing a 
phone number) or by expecting complementary behavior of various sorts 
… The stability of expectations rests on the constant cessation and renewal 
of actions, on their ›eventuality‹, their being events. (1995, 288f.)
However, in addition to these meaning facets of action in social process, our 
perspective calls up another feature of action; getting tasks done is the other 
half of social life. It concerns outcomes rather than the reproduction of social 
structure that we want to grasp. While Luhmann is not particularly interested 
in the production of outcomes, he does cite examples of disciplined action at 
many scopes: »The reconstruction of an automobile under specific limitations, 
the preparation of a department store for an ›end of the season‹ sale, the plan-
ning and performance of an opera, the transition from a colony to an inde-
pendent state.« (1995, 317) We argue (White et al. 2008) that disciplined action 
requires interlockings in networks going beyond transitivity. We propose three 
abstract families of such disciplines. Each example of some discipline must be 
able to reproduce itself as integral actor, as what we refer to as an identity. 
A discipline must call on and regulate comparability, with the connectivity of 
communication being secondary. Competition is central, and thence tracings 
of structural equivalence dominate interaction patterns. Precedence orderings 
of participants stabilize themselves and evoke perceptions of differential on 
some abstract value taken as theme. Then disciplines themselves get taken up 
as integral actors in further netdoms and disciplines. 
The sketch thus far has argued that action and communication facets of mean-
ing come intertwined – and more generally social and interpretive remain 
entangled right down to basal construction. Gibson in a subsequent paper 
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showed that the turn-taking configurations also correlate with a social net-
work that he independently recorded among group members. Endemic entan-
glement is seen in probes of language use (Halliday 1994). The Bothner and 
the Watts researches cited above both draw on discourse data and also touch 
on both action and communication facets. And one can turn to pronoun and 
other deictic usage, and generalizations within kinship nomenclature, for much 
broader empirical instantiations (Lucy 1993). Luhmann’s theoretical step at this 
point, however, seems to go beyond attribution of actions to focus on expecta-
tions at the level of social systems. 
IV. Switchings and Styles 
Now we introduce two more new concepts to further broaden our probes. 
Only sometimes is a dyad the minimal scope in a horizon. The meaning hori-
zon usually sees network locality, configuration of expectations, as neighbor-
hood star. Correlatively, communication also characterizes and is characterized 
by immediate context in domain of theme in that horizon. Since this correlates 
with network interlock, a suitable labeling is netdom (Mische / White 1998; 
White et al. 2008). While net refers to pattern of ties, dom for domain comprises 
stories, symbols, and expectations, and together they co-constitute a ›netdom‹. 
Expectations in a domain thus are held by multiple alters in intermittent repro-
duction of that social netdom across that neighborhood being perceived as 
egos. These expectations continue, as Luhmann has pointed out (1995, 284), 
to be negotiated and altered through communicative events. Such situational 
changes that »shift the other possibilities that they suggest« (1995, 284) cor-
respond to switchings in our theory, consistent with Luhmann. The selection of 
themes through events is what we observe as switchings among netdoms:
The communication process, by choosing a theme and contributions to it, 
excludes a lot and thereby grounds expectations … (1995, 292) Themes 
outlive contributions; they integrate different contributions into longer-
lasting, short-term or even long-term nexus of meaning. Themes have a 
factual content, which enables them to coordinate contributions … One 
can recall earlier contributions to a theme. (1995, 155f.)
But, whereas in Luhmann communication system and expectations cease to 
exist the moment actions disappear, netdoms can switch back, after pause, 
with expectations continued stable in social network context. This stability for 
us rests on the peculiar nature of identities in network domains, which are 
induced by and implicate actions, and not least the disciplines that emerge 
with but persist through the switchings. Luhmann comes close to this idea: 
»The accompanying observation’s somewhat more complex view of the mat-
ter can enter into the situationally bound selection of connective actions, even 
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more so into the selection, rejection and new selection of expectation.« (1995, 
300)
Identities are portrayed in the crystallized expectations which result from 
social process as they organize it across events in situations through netdom 
switching. Luhmann somehow seems to assume that the attribution of actions 
is an ephemeral process, which leads only to supra-personal expectations 
on the level of social systems. In contrast, we argue that this attribution pro-
duces identities which act as relatively stable cornerstones of the communica-
tion process. These identities are not limited to single neighborhoods either in 
network or domain. Instead, they are subject to repeated switching processes 
between domains – and it is precisely these switchings by which identities get 
triggered. A number of recent studies have stressed the importance of such 
identity construction, and its relational quality (McLean 1998; Collins 1998). 
Identities as actors result from network footings and themselves contribute to 
network formation and dynamics.
What we have been invoking as ›network‹ thus is a social spread that becomes 
recognized in second-order observation through transitive trajectory of neigh-
borhood stars in on-again, off-again appearances. Network is a profile from 
netdom switchings. And correlatively for domain, as particular themes con-
tinue to reappear; so network and domain are only analytically separable. They 
co-constitute each other as each gets discriminated in second order observa-
tion that cumulates across continuing switching. A set of stories settles out for 
such network over such domain as if in readings from a cloud chamber in par-
ticle physics. 
Meaning horizons need not be limited within netdoms and disciplines. We 
now turn to a larger analogue to switching, to another scope of multiplicity 
and multiplexity in meaning, beyond communicative and action. Again we 
seek grounding in Luhmann and call on second order observation. »External 
influences appear to self-referential systems only as determination for self-
determination and thus as information.« (1995, 68) In our terms, such informa-
tion events signal switches between the netdoms constituted in expectations of 
meaning. 
Meaning establishes itself in consort with horizon, and these changes of hori-
zon can be as much a matter of rhythm as of interdigitation, in which these 
become intertwined spreads in social time and space. Such syncopated com-
plexity occurs only through reproducing itself as an integral sensibility in first-
order observation. For ease of reference, and in deference to their distinction 
as sensibilities, we refer to syncopated complexities as styles. Myriad styles can 
be observed in ongoing social systems, in all sorts of scopes and distributions, 
over time and space and themes, most memorably in Mardi Gras and Carnival, 
which are recurrent though brief. 
Luhmann again foresees aspects of this:
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The anticipation of expectations induces all participants to take up 
orientations that reciprocally overlap in time and are, in this sense 
structural. This prevents social systems from being formed as mere chains 
of reactions in which one event more or less predictably leads to the next. 
The reflexivity of anticipation makes corrections (and even a struggle for 
corrections) possible on the level of expectations itself … the fact that 
one cannot take this complexity in at a glance entails, not that expecting 
expectations is irrelevant, but that symbolic abbreviations representing 
highly complex expectational situations are necessary for ongoing 
orientation. (1995, 305f.) 
Second-order observation can designate style as distinct emergent level. For 
and on the new level communication and action come into play also and 
separately. And style can transpose to further levels and scopes – in struc-
ture and process – leading to robust reproduction of syncopate complexities, 
with many pragmatic uses. Commercial formations of trade provide examples 
(Erikson / Bearman 2006), as do communities and markets (White 2002). Curi-
ously, style is a sort of mirroring of another emergence that Luhmann missed, 
of identities as they emerge in dance for control. 
V. Institutions and Functional Subsystems 
How can these style levels span across networks and disciplines? Through 
the play of netdom switchings across situations, expectations can cumulate 
into some array of institutions. Institutions, from handshakes to agendas, can 
provide a coding for situations that reaches across styles, disciplines and net-
works. 
As underlying flows of situations settle out, rhetorics are invoked for an insti-
tutional package. These rhetorics descant stories for networks and valuation 
orders for discipline identities. For example, an institutional package of kinship 
(White 1963) organizes expectations across diverse networks by tying actors 
in a web of exchanges amid predefined roles, such as husband and wife and 
nephew with uncle in our own day (Berger / Luckmann 1966). Rhetorics also 
can reflect profiles of switching rhythm across styles.
Luhmann himself claims that our current social system devolves into functional 
subsystems (economic, political, education, science, mass media … and so on) 
which each reproduce through a special coding. Disciplines each can be seen 
as containing rules of coding in some Luhmann program of such subsystem. 
He points to many functional subsystems and has published a series of explicit 
and detailed studies cast at universal scope: for example, Law as a Social System 
with legal / illegal as coding: see Luhmann (2004, 196, esp. footnotes).
We now further argue that one of Luhmann’s codes can implement a func-
tional subsystem only through some syncopated complexity with its attendant 
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sensibility. On a larger scale than the discipline, styles can program the codes 
of functional subsystems. A functional subsystem, in Luhmann’s sense, con-
tains one or more styles, we argue, but only as also cocooned and constrained 
by configurations of networks and action disciplines. Styles thus supplement 
Luhmann’s top-down focus on codes in the self-reproduction of functional 
sub-systems, as they dynamically commingle multiple relations in networks at 
an intermediate level, emerging from interactions rather than imposing them-
selves from above. 
Guidance as to how the cocooning develops can readily be adapted from Luh-
mann’s own seminal discussion of contradiction (ch. 9), which bears also on 
formation of disciplines and styles: 
Contradiction has a double function in all self-referential systems, namely, 
to block and to trigger, stopping observations that encounter contradictions 
and triggering connective operations that cope with contradictions and 
owe their meaningfulness exactly to this coping … contradictions are 
latent in every experience of meaning. (1995, 358ff.)
We also take this as foundational for the patterns of netdom switching observed, 
discussed earlier. Further, 
Because contradictions enable but do not compel the elimination of 
deviations … able also to accept useful changes ... They serve as alarm 
signals, … an immune system within the system … The immune system 
protects not structure but the system’s closed self-reproduction … through 
negation against negation.« (1995, 369ff.)
This mode of self-reproduction in functional subsystems can be specified fur-
ther by use of the concept of control regime (White et al. 2008). Control regimes 
induce special realms in accommodating a range of networks, disciplines and 
styles according to some template that proves self-sustaining like an institution. 
But control regime articulates and embeds some distinctive and binding value 
contrast across social networks through narrative. It is this peculiar organization 
around value with attendant mobilization which either eases or conceals con-
tradictions in functional subsystems in the very process of affirming them. 
In Luhmannian terms, a control regime – by integrating self-reproducing 
dynamics of systems through use of social networks and disciplines – directs 
analysis to specific programming for the application of codes. For example, one 
explores how codes of civic responsibility impact some decisions inside an eco-
nomic subsystem around money and profit codes. More generally, any control 
regime can be read off by the alarm signals it installs in communication sys-
tems. It should be added that control regimes, though they include, are not 
limited to functional subsystems. They can be extrapolated over communica-
tion, action and style constructs applied over ranges of historical paths and cul-
ture. 
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Luhmann argues for his functional subsystems as the overall key to modern 
society as a whole:
We can seek points of departure for increasing orientation to function, up 
to what is relatively improbable, in a stronger differentiation between action 
and observation … that at the same time does not question the communicative 
execution of self-observation. We thereby avoid teleological explanations, and 
also causal explanations … the hypothesis is that … it becomes probable 
that relatively improbable (more demanding, e. g., more specialized) 
functional orientations will take place and select corresponding structures. 
(1995, 302)
And in doing so he comes close to calling for styles as syncopate complexities 
in subsystems:
A society that constructs greater complexity must therefore find forms 
for creating and tolerating structural insecurity. It must guarantee its own 
autopoesis over and beyond its own structures, and this requires not least 
a greater inclusion of the temporal dimension in the creation and working 
out of contradictions. (1995, 378)
Conclusion
Integral persons do not feature as basic building blocks in Luhmann’s theory 
– nor do they in ours. However, while his account alternates between the dyad 
and the distinction between system and environment as foundations, our the-
ory builds on the interplay of identities and control. This enables us to capture 
various intermediate levels and dynamics in the implementation and self-refer-
ential reproduction of functional sub-systems, beyond the dyad-system divide. 
We argue that netdom switching is at the heart of the induction of free-stand-
ing identities among and with communication and action, amidst unending 
struggles for control to attain social footing. Identities reproduce themselves as 
distinct emergent level in communication and action yielding social footings 
for control, as was long ago argued by Goffman (1974, cf. 299). A further dis-
tinct level of identities appears with disciplines that get established amid net-
work population. And in staccato dance, all these identities can adjoin across 
domains and adjacency into emergent level of style as identity, which can be 
exemplified by persons. The introduction of the style construct is the nub of our 
divergence from Luhmann’s approach, which does however help clarify foun-
dations for networks and disciplines. Identities can also embed into overarch-
ing control regimes, such as functional subsystems, often in a joint embedding 
with some institutional rhetoric.
Though Luhmann may have feared opening Pandora’s box (see in Rasch 2000, 
Appendix: Two Interviews), we (White et al. 2008) open up that box as a cornu-
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copia of specifiable types of social formation which interweave across scopes 
and levels in business and everyday life, yet also include recondite reaches of 
our and past civilizations. The theory is self-similar, with recurrence under the 
same principles at many scopes and levels, with diverse nestings and parallel-
isms. Disparate empirical studies in sociology can be made coherent thereby. 
Luhmann (1995) had turned for coherent general framing to a bare yet highly 
abstract theory:
systems develop forms of access to complexity that are not available to 
scientific analysis and simulation … ›black boxes‹ (14) … every social contact 
is understood as a system (15) … As soon as one goes beyond quantitative 
theory toward qualification, one can no longer forgo considering that and 
how systems qualify as elements the elements that compose them. (20f.)
A valuable result was this focus on how elements in a network of possible 
connections get qualified from above, so to speak. Now one can attempt to 
describe possible constraints on interplay of different elements by building up 
variously from story-sets with networks out of our own foundation in identi-
ties emergent from control attempts. 
Testing and development of these theories require specifications of a variety of 
particular applications, as Identity and Control emphasizes, by including about 
a hundred case studies.4 Also important is comparing the two theories by the 
questions they point to about broader realms. We have begun this latter proc-
ess. First we are working up contrasts of assessments of journalism by Luh-
mann and from our own approach. Journalism disrupts the styles at the heart 
of any particular functional subsystem by conversion to the gossip of every-
day.5 
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